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Abstract 
The everyday uses of networked media technologies, especially social media, have revolutionized the classical model of 
top-down surveillance. This article sketches the contours of an emerging culture of interveillance where non-
hierarchical and non-systematic monitoring practices are part of everyday life. It also introduces a critical perspective 
on how the industrial logics of dominant social media, through which interveillance practices are normalized, resonate 
with social forces already at play in individualized societies. The argument is developed in three steps. Firstly, it is ar-
gued that the concept of interveillance is needed, and must be distinguished from surveillance, in order to critically as-
sess the everyday mutual sharing and disclosure of private information (of many different kinds). Secondly, it is argued 
that the culture of interveillance responds to the social deficit of recognition that characterizes highly individualized so-
cieties. Finally, it is argued that the culture of interveillance constitutes a defining instance and even represents a new 
stage of the meta-process of mediatization. The dialectical nature of interveillance integrates and reinforces the over-
arching ambiguities of mediatization, whereby the opportunities for individuals and groups to achieve growing freedom 
and autonomy are paralleled by limitations and dependences vis-à-vis media. 
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1. Introduction 
In the last decade we have seen the arrival of what 
might be considered a new stage in the history of me-
diatization. The parallel expansion of social media, mo-
bile media devices and various lifestyle applications 
constitutes more than a technological shift. It also de-
notes a social and cultural shift through which more 
and more areas of social life become saturated with 
and dependent on processes of mediation. There are 
today mobile applications for almost any kind of life-
style practice, through which activities can be meas-
ured, stored and shared. At first sight the growing ten-
dency to monitor, quantify and comment on one’s own 
life as well as those of others may seem like a media-
invoked transformation following certain technologi-
cally enabled and commercially driven logics of social 
media industries (van Dijck & Poell, 2013). However, 
the emergence and significance of such logics should 
also be understood in relation to social forces that 
have long prevailed in modern society and can be 
traced to broader structural transformations, above all 
individualization.  
In this mainly theoretical essay, the key idea that 
will be elaborated on is that we (that is, those of us 
who live in societies marked by digital media abun-
dance) are immersed in a culture of interveillance. This 
perspective provides a way of capturing the social em-
beddedness of contemporary surveillance processes, 
typically governed by commercial forces, while at the 
same time recognizing the non-hierarchical and non-
systematic nature of most social monitoring processes 
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occurring in everyday life. It is also a way of pointing 
out what is new about contemporary mediatization; 
how the industrial logics of dominant social media res-
onate with the everyday social characteristics of indi-
vidualized modern society. Mediatization is basically 
understood as a historical meta-process whereby a vari-
ety of social realms, in organizational settings as well as 
everyday life, become increasingly adapted to and de-
pendent upon media technologies and institutions (see, 
e.g., Couldry & Hepp, 2013; Krotz, 2007; Lundby, 2014).   
Starting out from these fundamental assumptions, 
my aim is to explore three interconnected arguments, 
each constituting a separate section of the text. Firstly, 
it will be argued that the concept of interveillance is 
needed in order to critically assess the everyday mutu-
al sharing and disclosure of private information (of 
many different kinds) that constitutes an increasing 
share of all media practices. The concept is needed not 
only for defining particular forms of mediated interac-
tion, namely those forms marked by digital connectivi-
ty (van Dijck, 2012, 2013), but also more indirectly in 
order to preserve the conceptual specificity and critical 
potential of the term surveillance. In the first part of 
the essay the properties of interveillance will be dis-
cussed in relation to related concepts, notably lateral 
surveillance (Andrejevic, 2005) and social surveillance 
(Marwick, 2012).   
Secondly, it will be argued that the culture of inter-
veillance responds to the social deficit of recognition 
that characterizes highly individualized societies. Inter-
veillance breeds in the soils of an other-directed social 
landscape that had already been diagnosed in the mid 
20th century by sociologists like David Riesman (1950) and 
later by Giddens (1991) and Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 
(2002), amongst others. The second part of the essay will, 
through an engagement with Axel Honneth’s (2012) 
theory of recognition, discuss the ways in which domi-
nant forms of social media and accompanying represen-
tational spaces of interveillance largely reinforce this 
sense of lack, while at the same time circulating promis-
es of mutual recognition and individual growth. This is to 
say that the culture of interveillance holds a dialectical 
character where striving for recognition coalesces with 
social simulations that bind individuals closer to techno-
logical and commercial structures of dependence.  
Thirdly, by way of conclusion, it will be argued that 
the culture of interveillance constitutes a defining in-
stance of contemporary mediatization. The dialectical 
nature of interveillance integrates and reinforces the 
overarching ambiguities of mediatization, whereby the 
opportunities for individuals and groups to achieve 
growing freedom and autonomy are paralleled by limi-
tations and dependences vis-à-vis media. Interveillance 
constitutes an entry point for grasping how new forms 
of normalized media dependence are replacing and 
displacing pre-established patterns tied to the mass 
media era. Interveillance gives us an analytical tool for 
conducting critical analyses of how the dialectics of 
mediatization are played out and socially constructed 
at the level of everyday life.  
This article should also make an epistemological 
contribution to the mediatization debate. Whereas 
mediatization research has been accused of being me-
dia-centric, that is, explaining social transformations 
too much in terms of media change (see Deacon & 
Stanyer, 2014), my analysis adheres to the broadly ac-
cepted view of mediatization as concerned with the in-
terplay between media, culture and society (see, e.g., 
Hepp, 2013; Hepp, Hjarvard, & Lundby, 2015; Krotz, 
2007). Through the concept of interveillance, which ar-
ticulates the fundamental role of long-term social 
transformations like individualization in conditioning 
media change, the aim is to stress the continuously 
contested and socially moulded nature of mediatiza-
tion (Jansson, forthcoming). In addition, the dialectical 
understanding of mediatization paves the way for re-
thinking mediatization as a research programme for 
immanent critique. Mediatization is at its strongest 
when it captures the inherent and continuously evolv-
ing social contradictions and ambivalences that mark 
out media saturated societies, notably in terms of lib-
erating versus constraining forces. Accordingly, the dia-
lectical perspective needs to move beyond and build 
bridges between the predominant social-constructivist 
and institutionalist frameworks (see Couldry & Hepp, 
2013). In the more confined analysis of interveillance 
the combination of recognition theory (Honneth, 2012) 
and theorizations of emerging “social media logics” 
(van Dijck & Poell, 2013) constitutes one such bridge. 
2. Interveillance and the Social Relocation of Media 
One thing that distinguishes our contemporary media 
landscape from what it looked like just one or two dec-
ades ago is the social location of media. In addition to 
their traditional position between people and various 
organizational entities (including media institutions) that 
characterized the mass media landscape (see Hjarvard, 
2013, pp. 23-27), media technologies are now to a 
greater extent located between people. This is not to say 
that interpersonal media are all new; telephony and the 
postal system have been crucial to the history of moder-
nity. Nor is it to say that today’s networked media, ena-
bling various forms of many-to-many communication, 
have replaced mass media; rather these forms co-exist 
and interact in various ways, giving rise to increasingly 
complex media landscapes. If we are to understand the 
consequences of mediatization at the level of social life, 
that is, how various lifestyle sectors (Giddens, 1991) are 
successively made dependent on and adapted to certain 
technologies and institutions of mediation (Jansson, 
2013), we must account for this multi-layeredness while 
at the same time disentangling what is succinctly new 
about the current situation. 
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A relevant framework for identifying the novelty of 
our networked media landscape is suggested by van 
Dijck and Poell (2013), who introduce four elements of 
what they call “social media logic”: programmability, 
popularity, connectivity and datafication. Whereas the 
whole idea of any coherent “media logic(s)” should be 
treated with great caution, it is fair to argue that there 
exist processes at the industrial level of media circula-
tion that are built into the very techno-economic archi-
tecture. As Hepp (2013, p. 46) points out in a critique 
of media logic(s), “in the functionalities of media logic 
we no longer see the acting subjects, the meaningful-
ness of their action, as well as all the other problems of 
power in communication”. This is important. In adopt-
ing van Dijck and Poell’s (2013) notion of social media 
logics it should not be inferred that mediatization fol-
lows any clear-cut social logic(s), but that there are cer-
tain industrial mechanisms that follow calculated or-
ders, notably algorithms, for profit maximisation. These 
mechanisms respond to and reinforce the social behav-
iour of media users, and can be located in a particular 
area of the digital media landscape, which may be 
called dominant social media. Such media may take the 
form of websites or mobile applications and involve so-
cial networking sites (e.g., Facebook, LinkedIn), video 
sharing sites (e.g., YouTube), blogs and microblogs 
(e.g., Twitter, Weibo), as well as social media exten-
sions of various lifestyle applications (e.g., RunKeeper, 
Nike+). What they have in common is that they turn 
“platformed sociality” (van Dijck, 2013, p. 4) into eco-
nomic value through the development and implemen-
tation of industrial logics (see also Gillespie, 2010; 
Striphas, 2015).  
This is not the place for going deeper into each of 
the four elements suggested by van Dijck and Poell 
(2013). Instead, two general points will be advanced, 
related foremost to popularity and connectivity that 
are particularly important for describing how industrial 
logics play into the on-going social relocation of media, 
which will also lead us further to the question of inter-
veillance. Firstly, van Dijck and Poell (2013, pp. 6-7) 
stress that the implementation of various measure-
ments of popularity, such as the Like-mechanism, con-
stitutes the extension of economic drivers that were al-
ready at place in commercial mass media settings in 
the shape of, for instance, top lists and ratings. The dif-
ference today is that individual media users may also 
take part in this competition for popularity, where the 
automated generation of friend stats on Facebook and 
follower counts on Twitter becomes, for instance, a 
means of expressing social integration and success. At 
the same time, media users are turned into (unpaid) 
“prosumers” of media content and the social media in-
dustry is given raw material for generating economic 
turnover through advertising sales (see also Fuchs, 
2014, Ch. 5).  
Secondly, van Dijck and Poell (2013, pp. 8-9) intro-
duce a crucial distinction between connectivity and 
connectedness. Whereas connectedness is all about the 
meaningful social connections between individuals and 
groups—which social media promote and which vari-
ous media have enhanced and extended in different 
ways since their very origin—connectivity refers to 
“the socio-technological affordance of networked plat-
forms to connect content to user activities and adver-
tisers” (van Dijck & Poell, 2013, p. 8). This means that 
the social practices that these platforms mediate are 
actually not as free and open-ended as one might 
think, but partly governed and exploited via the algo-
rithms of the techno-economic architecture (see also 
Striphas, 2015). In everyday life the distinction be-
tween connectivity and connectedness becomes diffi-
cult to identify since, for instance, many close relations 
may also be exploited and reproduced via automated 
connective processes, and vice versa. The important 
point is precisely this accentuated fuzziness between 
connectedness and connectivity—the fact that social 
relations are to a certain extent premediated and simu-
lated through automated patterns of connectivity. 
These concepts will be further explored below.  
Accordingly, the elements of popularity and con-
nectivity reinforce one another; connectivity operates 
as a support for reaching the goal of popularity. In 
more straightforward terms, this development can be 
described as an escalating commoditization of social 
life, which today expands beyond the confines of par-
ticular groups and particular forms of communication 
(see, e.g., Fuchs, 2014, Ch. 5). In transmedia environ-
ments, where information flows smoothly between dif-
ferent platforms and devices, almost any kind of eve-
ryday practice can be measured, recorded and 
circulated/shared, and thus commoditized, as infor-
mation either through embedded social functionalities 
of applications such as RunKeeper, or through external 
sharing via, for example, Facebook or Instagram. The 
industrial logics of social media stimulate their us-
ers/prosumers to think of their peers, whether close 
friends or more distant acquaintances, as audiences of 
their own lifestyle performances (see Marwick, 2013; 
Marwick & boyd, 2011; Turkle, 2011). In this way, dom-
inant social media are part of gradually normalizing 
new forms of reflexivity and new ways of relating to 
the social world. As we will see, however, the identifi-
cation of “social media logics” at the industrial level 
should not lead us to adopt a media-centric view of so-
cial transformations.   
Surveillance is part and parcel of these alterations. 
Whilst mass media institutions have long conducted or 
consulted various kinds of audience research in order 
to increase the popularity of media products and sell 
audience segments to advertisers, digital media plat-
forms enable datafication and automated, or interac-
tive, surveillance (see Andrejevic, 2007). Datafication 
implies that media industries as well as other commer-
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cial actors are able to retrieve advanced profiles of the 
market and automatically target their advertising, even 
on a real-time basis, through instantaneous analysis of 
user generated data streams (Striphas, 2015; Trottier, 
2011; Trottier & Lyon, 2012). Digital transmedia tech-
nologies thus revolutionize the classical model of top-
down surveillance, defined as the systematic collation 
and analysis of information in order to exercise power 
over a certain population or territory (see, e.g., Gid-
dens, 1987, pp. 14-15; Lyon, 2007, p. 14). Furthermore, 
several researchers have pointed out that surveillance 
expands beyond administrative settings (economy and 
state) and in various ways has come to saturate social 
life in the form of peer-to-peer monitoring (e.g., An-
drejevic, 2005). This tendency should be seen in light of 
the aforementioned relocation process, through which 
individuals and groups start relating to themselves 
more and more as manageable symbolic entities, even 
brands (see Marwick, 2013).  
These diagnoses of technologically- and industrially-
driven social change should certainly inform a critical 
view of mediatization. However, they suffer from a re-
curring dilemma when it comes to conceptual stringen-
cy. When applying the term surveillance to the analysis 
and understanding of more horizontal processes of in-
formation gathering and disclosure one runs the risk of 
misnaming and simplifying aspects of social life that are 
dense with social and cultural ambivalences. For in-
stance, the concept of lateral surveillance, introduced 
by Andrejevic (2005), refers to “peer-to-peer monitor-
ing, understood as the use of surveillance tools by indi-
viduals, rather than by agents of institutions, public or 
private, to keep track of one another” (Andrejevic, 
2005, p. 488). The basic argument is that the expanding 
availability of new online technologies has also fos-
tered a socio-cultural climate where people get accus-
tomed to checking up on others in order to avoid risk, 
for example in relation to new romantic interests. 
Whereas Andrejevic points to a significant new area of 
communicational practice, it is difficult to distinguish to 
what extent and in which particular cases this type of 
peer-to-peer monitoring falls under the original defini-
tion of surveillance. The kinds of “check-ups” that An-
drejevic discusses are often far from systematic and 
may be more acquainted with everyday social phe-
nomena driven by affection and curiosity, even a desire 
for knowledge. They also, literally, contradict the hier-
archical relations that originally used to define surveil-
lance. Albrechtslund (2008), who proposes the concept 
of participatory surveillance for analyzing similar moni-
toring practices, even sees this as a potential source of 
social empowerment among “ordinary” or disadvan-
taged groups of people—a conclusion that contradicts 
Andrejevic’s more critical view.  
Similarly, Marwick’s (2012) notion of social surveil-
lance, which refers to the social media practices of 
“closely examining content created by others and look-
ing at one’s own content through other people’s eyes” 
(Marwick, 2012, p. 378), problematizes the power dy-
namics associated with surveillance. Her point is that 
even though social surveillance is marked by reciproci-
ty—that is, when people give away information they 
expect to get something back—it can still be framed by 
the notion of surveillance, because it leads to self-
management among social media users through the 
“internalization of the surveilled gaze” (Marwick, 2012, 
p. 381). Even sharing Marwick’s understanding of how 
social surveillance is entangled with everyday power 
relations, informed by Foucault’s (1977) notion of ca-
pillaries of power, two main problems may be detect-
ed. Firstly, much empirical research shows that the 
kinds of practices that Marwick highlights are not often 
systematically undertaken, but rather occur within the 
realm of more or less floating everyday routines (see, 
e.g., Christensen, 2014; Humphreys, 2011; Jansson, 
2014a). When self-monitoring practices escalate into 
well thought out strategies for improving one’s reputa-
tion or performance, such as among amateur bloggers 
and in certain media related professions or among ad-
herents of the Quantified Self movement, one might 
probably speak of systematic procedures, and thus 
surveillance in the stricter sense. But these groups con-
stitute quite exceptional cases and thus contradict 
Marwick’s depiction of social surveillance as a wide-
spread phenomenon related to social media in general.  
Secondly, when speaking of the internalization of 
the surveilled gaze, what Marwick outlines is largely a 
technologically driven cultivation process, akin to An-
drejevic’s thoughts on how the spread of new surveil-
lance tools instils new forms of behaviour among ordi-
nary people. Also if we would agree on the idea that 
monitoring practices enabled by dominant social media 
are to be seen as a particular kind of surveillance we 
should be cautious about placing all social media use 
under the same rubric. Whereas the industrial logics of 
social media, and the elements of connectivity and 
popularity in particular, may sustain a drive towards 
more open-ended forms bonding, as identified already 
in Wittel’s (2001) analyses of network sociality, studies 
also show that social media (just like other technolo-
gies) are appropriated in culturally specific ways (e.g., 
Christensen, 2014; Jansson, 2014a). 
We thus need a concept that allows for complex 
analyses of the social processes related to mediated 
monitoring and control—without emptying out the 
original meaning and critical potential of the term sur-
veillance. What may be termed interveillance resem-
bles closely the phenomena outlined by Andrejevic, Al-
brechtslund and Marwick.1 Interveillance includes the 
                                                          
1 Another concept that has been juxtaposed with surveillance 
is sousveillance, coined by artist Steve Mann. However, 
sousveillance should be seen as a deliberate reaction to surveil-
lance processes, involving highly reflexive and technologically 
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kinds of everyday check-ups that Andrejevic discusses, 
as well as Albrechtslund’s more expressively oriented 
practices and the anticipation of other people’s medi-
ated gazes. Interveillance also includes the normaliza-
tion of horizontal networking practices that Marwick 
refers to. Interveillance means that social agents to a 
growing extent come to understand and define the re-
lations between themselves and others via automati-
cally generated recommendations of contacts and 
commodities (connectivity) and quantified simulations 
of social status (popularity). Interveillance practices are 
thus inseparable from societal surveillance processes, 
foremost algorithmically based commercial surveil-
lance (datafication), but they are not systematic and 
hierarchical per se. Rather, they are driven by the fun-
damental social needs through which identities are 
(re)created and manifested, and thus take on a rela-
tively non-reflexive and volatile character (see Table 1).  
Table 1. Analytical distinctions between surveillance 
and interveillance. 
 Surveillance Interveillance 





















Furthermore, to the extent that interveillance practices 
become part of everyday life, they do not look the 
same and do not involve the same media in all social 
groups and in all walks of life. This means that if we 
want to grasp the culture of interveillance as a broader 
and socially complex transformation we have to com-
bine media-centric models of altered “media logics”, 
understood as industrial modes of accumulation as dis-
cussed above, with historically contextualized under-
standings of socio-cultural structures and their trans-
formation. In the following section attention will turn 
to Honneth’s (2012) theory of recognition in order to 
outline a critical perspective through which the social 
nature and historical development of interveillance can 
be further explicated and problematized. Through this 
elaboration a more general account will be developed 
of mediatization as a dialectical process that integrates 
interveillance as a key feature and increasingly promi-
                                                                                           
advanced political actions and artistic interventions that aim to 
strengthen the power and communion of “ordinary citizens”. 
While partly related, the concept covers a different set of prac-
tices and different social dynamics than the horizontal forms of 
everyday monitoring discussed here.  
nent social force behind the current escalation of eve-
ryday media dependence. 
3. Interveillance and Simulated Recognition  
First of all we must specify what recognition means and 
why it has become a critical issue in modern society. 
Honneth (2012), who takes his key from psychoanalyti-
cal theory, sees recognition as a basic requirement for 
the individual to establish a sense of security in his or 
her capability of thinking, reflecting and acting inde-
pendently of other individuals. Such a sense of auton-
omy cannot emerge without the positive attention 
from significant others, who contribute to both social 
integration and a sense of individual worth on behalf of 
the individual. The individual’s desire to belong to 
groups is thus not merely a reflection of integrative 
forces, but should be understood as a quest for auton-
omy through recognition. One of the predicaments of 
Honneth’s theory of recognition is that “groups should 
be understood, whatever their size or type, as a social 
mechanism that serves the interests or needs of the 
individual by helping him or her to achieve personal 
stability and growth” (Honneth, 2012, p. 203). Howev-
er, the membership of groups gives no guarantee for 
recognition in the true sense of the word, since groups 
may also involve repressive tendencies that rather lead 
to conformism and the dissolution of autonomy.  
In Honneth’s positive definition of the term, recog-
nition “should be understood as a genus comprising 
various forms of practical attitudes whose primary in-
tention consists in a particular act of affirming another 
person or group” (Honneth, 2012, pp. 80-81). The con-
cept thus contains three basic premises: recognition 
should be (1) positively affirmative, (2) actualized 
through concrete action (rather than just symbolical in 
nature), and (3) explicitly intended (rather than emerg-
ing as a social side effect or means for reaching other 
goals). It is also stated that the basic attitude of recog-
nition can take the form of different “sub-species”, no-
tably love, legal respect and esteem. Against such pure 
stances of recognition Honneth poses ideological forms 
of recognition that rather exploit the individual’s psy-
chosocial needs in order to install attitudes that repro-
duce certain structures of domination. One example is 
the way in which societies of different epochs have en-
dorsed certain attributes among certain groups (based 
on gender, sexuality, ethnicity, and so on) as part of 
the reproduction of hegemonic orders for the division 
of labour: “We could easily cite past examples that 
demonstrate just how often public displays of recogni-
tion merely serve to create and maintain an individual 
relation-to-self that is seamlessly integrated into a sys-
tem based on the prevailing division of labour” (Hon-
neth, 2012, p. 77). Such ideological forms of recogni-
tion are false, Honneth argues, because they fail to 
promote personal autonomy. 
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Recognition theory has so far gained very little at-
tention within media studies, and vice versa.2 In my 
view, Honneth’s thinking around recognition lays the 
ground for a broader social critique of how the expan-
sion of interveillance resonates with structural trans-
formations. His analyses point especially to the nega-
tive consequences of an extended individualization 
process, including forces that under the auspices of 
supporting autonomy and recognition actually operate 
in the opposite direction. Whereas individualization in 
its positive fulfilment sets individuals free from oppres-
sive structures and normalizes the pluralization of 
choice it also leads to a state of increased psychological 
anxiety and vulnerability among individuals, which in 
turn can be seen as “one, if not the, central motive be-
hind group formation today” (Honneth, 2012, p. 207). 
Since modern society, as opposed to more traditional 
formations, does not provide one unified standard (such 
as religiously grounded ethics) in relation to which the 
individual may estimate the value of his or her achieve-
ments, it becomes increasingly important for the indi-
vidual to achieve recognition within the peer group. Fur-
thermore, media institutions, labour markets and a 
multitude of commercial and political actors promote 
individuals to actively work on their identities and learn 
how to present their personalities in ways that are as 
beneficial as possible for reaching certain goals in soci-
ety or in their careers. Honneth (2004, 2012, Ch. 9) 
calls this organized self-realization, which implies that 
self-realization becomes ideologically normalized as a 
biographical goal. Genuinely dialogical processes of 
recognition are undermined and replaced by standard-
ized patterns of identity-seeking and simulated forms 
of recognition that serve the goal of legitimizing and 
further integrating individuals into the capitalist sys-
tem. Authenticity and autonomy transmute into their 
opposites, simulation and conformism, and individuals 
may ultimately find their lives devoid of meaning. 
We can now discern the connection to interveil-
lance. What Honneth outlines is a dialectical transfor-
mation whereby the individual quest for recognition 
and autonomy rather leads to the legitimation of and 
dependence on various technological and economic 
                                                          
2 On the whole, recognition theory attains a strong political and 
social philosophical bias. In a recent volume entitled Recogni-
tion Theory as Social Research (O’Neill & Smith, 2012), in spite 
of the broad scope of the book, none of the eleven chapters 
addresses the pervasive role of media for shaping contempo-
rary relations of recognition. In media and communication 
studies the work by Nancy Fraser (e.g., 2000, 2001) has gained 
substantial attention among scholars studying for instance the 
politics of identity and migration. The most significant work 
that has brought together questions of recognition and media-
tion is Boltanski’s (1996/1999) book Distant Suffering. This 
work deals chiefly with spectatorship, however, and is linked to 
questions of pity and self-justification in the age of mass medi-
ated humanitarian spectacles.  
systems (see also, e.g., Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002; 
Boltanski & Chiapello, 1999/2007; Giddens, 1991). Hon-
neth does not pay much attention to media technologies 
and institutions, however. To the extent they are men-
tioned, they are taken as a compound institution, “elec-
tronic media” (Honneth, 2012, p. 162), that operates as 
a machinery for normalizing desirable formats of self-
realization through for example advertising and popular 
fiction, which play the role of legitimizing certain ideo-
logical forms of recognition. This diagnosis resonates in 
interesting ways with Riesman’s (1950/2001) account 
of how other-directedness spread as the dominant 
mode of social conformity in post-war America, involv-
ing reflexive forms of lifestyle management among the 
urban middle classes. The desire to achieve mutual 
recognition among peers was channelled through 
standardized consumption practices whose symbolic 
meanings were socially implanted via mass media.  
The mass media system thus operates both as a 
map and a guidebook of the social terrain; a system 
that establishes and negotiates the codes through 
which patterns of interpersonal recognition (and mis-
recognition) evolve. This means that mass media not 
only mediate but also, and perhaps more significantly, 
premediate social expectations and experiences of in-
dividual actors (Grusin, 2010), turning the process of 
(mass) mediation per se into a force of symbolic legiti-
mation. What (and who) is mediated is what counts as 
important. As Couldry (2003) suggests, the symbolic 
power of media (taken in the broad, institutional 
sense) rests on a dominant mythology that constructs 
the media as an institution that circulates symbolic ma-
terial possessing exceptional social, cultural, economic 
and/or political significance. This mythology functions 
as a stabilizing factor in relation to the social anxieties 
articulated through organized self-realization, and le-
gitimizes people’s ritualized dependence on mass me-
dia as a structure of premediated recognition.  
Today we must rethink these relations. The wide-
spread usage of social media, mobile devices and nu-
merous transmedia applications has in recent years 
come to play into the social functions of mass media, 
both challenging and extending them. A growing share 
of media users, especially younger groups, orient their 
media habits towards interactive platforms, such as Fa-
cebook and YouTube, that circulate user-generated 
flows as well as content emanating from mass media 
industries.3 As Gillespie (2010, p. 347) argues, these 
platforms have become the “curators of public dis-
course”. They both enable and demand continuous 
monitoring and updating, and thus feed off precisely 
                                                          
3 In Sweden, for instance, one of the leading countries in this 
development, more than 50 per cent of young Internet users 
(ages 12−18 years) use YouTube every day and more than 50 
per cent of Internet users between 20 and 45 years old use 
YouTube every week (Findahl, 2014).  
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those psychosocial needs and desires that characterize 
other-directed life environments, while at the same 
time extending the pre-established mythology of insti-
tutionalized mediation as a marker of socio-cultural 
status. Accordingly, dominant social media build their 
success upon the promises of providing solutions to 
recognition deficit, but contribute at the same time to 
the reinforcement of interveillance culture through the 
circulation of simulated forms of recognition, which 
now exist alongside various premediated forms.  
This is not to say that all forms of interaction that 
occur via dominant social media resonate with the in-
dustrially invoked logics of popularity scores and simu-
lations of connectedness, or that all forms of recogni-
tion on these platforms are of an ideological nature. It 
is not to say that connective practices, such as liking, 
commenting and (geo)tagging, are always to be seen as 
mere expressions of interveillance and cannot be part 
of deeper relations of recognition, such as love, friend-
ship or identity politics, or make up community main-
taining flows of phatic communication (see, e.g., Ling, 
2008; Miller, 2008). However, the architecture of dom-
inant social media and the interfaces through which in-
terveillance unfolds sustain open-ended processes of 
simulation where the distinction between connectivity 
and connectedness is collapsed (van Dijck, 2013). For 
instance, whereas algorithmic systems keep track of 
how many connections (friends, followers, etc.) differ-
ent users have and how many confirmative acts certain 
posts generate, these functionalities contradict the dia-
logical aspects that mark pure forms of recognition and 
make it possible for each actor to hermeneutically as-
sess and build trust in the intentionality and practical 
relevance of other communicators’ symbolic acts (cf. 
Striphas, 2015). On the contrary, social media relations 
are typically marked by uncertainty as to what inten-
tions and what level of involvement may hide behind 
the digital interface, that is, what is “actually” going on.  
This mediated social uncertainty, which can be 
identified in areas as diverse as political action (e.g., re-
lated to microblogging) and intimate relations (e.g., da-
ting sites), is exactly what characterizes and reinforces 
the culture of interveillance. In interveillance there is 
never any affirmative dialogue. In interveillance, recog-
nition is continuously at stake, but never achieved.  
In this section, an explanation has been provided of 
how the expanding industrial logics of social media in-
teract with long-term social transformations of individ-
ualized societies. The overarching point is that domi-
nant social media contribute to the normalization of 
simulated forms of recognition, which establishes in-
terveillance as a ritualized part of everyday life and 
makes certain media devices and applications ritually 
indispensable to social life. At the same time, however, 
we should embrace the fact that the overall conse-
quences of interveillance are ambiguous and take on 
different (often contradictory) appearances in different 
contexts. We should also take into account that inter-
veillance is intertwined with and inseparable from 
deeper forms of mutual recognition and emancipatory 
forms of communication that take place between peers 
through a variety of media (e.g., Caughlin & Sharabi, 
2013; Jiang & Hancock, 2013; Linke, 2011).  
When raising critical questions concerning the so-
cial and existential costs of our connected lives we 
should thus move beyond simplified views of social 
fragmentation and media power. Rather, the type of 
social and cultural critique that should be considered is 
of an immanent nature (see, e.g., Fornäs, 2013). The 
purpose of immanent critique is precisely to grasp the 
contradictions and ambiguities that characterize social 
transformations on both individual and structural lev-
els, and explore how these levels are interrelated. In 
the following section I will discuss the ways in which 
the culture of interveillance may signify a new stage 
within the broader dialectical meta-process of mediati-
zation.  
4. Interveillance and the Dialectics of Mediatization 
Two main points have so far been advanced. Firstly, it 
has been described how interveillance is related to the 
social relocation of media, including the growing prom-
inence of dominant social media, and argued that we 
need to maintain analytical distinctions between inter-
veillance and surveillance (Table 1). Secondly, it has 
been argued that the emerging culture of interveil-
lance, and its variations, can only be sufficiently under-
stood if we account for how the industrial logics of so-
cial media resonate with social forces already at play in 
individualized societies, above all the increasingly 
open-ended quest for recognition. This is where we 
find the fundamental energy that drives and entertains 
the commercial machineries of dominant social media, 
which in turn occupy an increasingly significant role in 
normalizing partly new ways of defining social relations 
and senses of self (notably in terms of connectivity and 
popularity). The culture of interveillance thus arises 
through the mutual operation of social and techno-
economic forces. It denotes a cultural condition where 
identity creation is saturated with monitoring practices 
based on simulations of connectedness and recogni-
tion, thus reproducing the ambiguities of recognition 
they were intended to stabilize. 
What follows from this is my third and concluding 
point; the culture of interveillance both integrates and 
reinforces the dialectics of mediatization. The term 
mediatization refers to something more than just the 
general development and appropriation of more media 
within more areas of social life. While such quantitative 
elements are indeed part and parcel of the mediatiza-
tion meta-process, as Hepp (2013) points out, we can 
only estimate the real force of mediatization once we 
are able to detect substantial social and cultural trans-
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formations tied to the establishment of new media 
technologies as cultural forms (Williams, 1974; see also 
Hjarvard & Nybro Petersen, 2013). When this happens, 
as it did with radio and television during the broadcast-
ing era, media are experienced as more or less indis-
pensable and social life becomes difficult to manage, 
and indeed to imagine, without them. During a long 
period of the 20th century, and still today, modern life 
was spatially and temporally ordered in relation to the 
material and cultural properties of these media (see, 
e.g., Scannell, 1996; Spigel, 1992). While broadcasting, 
taken as one institution, enabled new forms of social 
extension and functioned as a (pre)mediator of recog-
nition, as discussed above, it also established (more or 
less context specific) dependencies vis-à-vis certain 
flows of information and certain technologies.   
In a similar manner, the culture of interveillance 
encompasses the normalization of a new set of every-
day media routines and the taken-for-grantedness of 
certain media ensembles—such as, smartphones, tab-
lets, Wi-Fi networks and social media accounts. Inter-
veillance practices, as we have seen, are thoroughly in-
terwoven with other kinds of everyday practices and 
are rarely systematic or strategic in nature. They come 
to surface as “something one just does”, while on the 
move or while waiting, during free time or while pursu-
ing other routines. They are also interwoven with other 
online activities (news gathering, shopping, gaming, 
and so forth), which together contribute to the social 
construction of media as indispensable things (Jansson, 
2014b). There are several empirical studies showing 
that a life without mobile media devices and various 
social media applications would be more or less un-
thinkable to many social groups today and that people 
even develop counter-routines in order to cope with 
their experiences of being increasingly “addicted” to 
keeping an eye on various information flows and up-
dates, responses to things they have posted online and 
the fluctuations of social media scores (e.g., Bengtsson, 
2015; Hall & Baym, 2012; Paasonen, 2014).  
Dependencies may also be of a more formal, trans-
actional nature. As we have already seen, the basically 
horizontal processes of interveillance are structurally 
integrated with vertical processes of automated com-
mercial surveillance. This means that each user of an 
online service has to subscribe to terms and conditions 
that allow the service provider to aggregate, store and 
analyze data flows in order to build consumer seg-
ments for targeted online advertising, that is, to main-
tain the industrial logics. The kinds of recognition that 
may stem from such personalized services and publicity 
offers are ideological in the sense that they contribute 
to the legitimation of the dominant system itself rather 
than to individual autonomy (following Honneth, 
2012). Whereas this means that many social media 
sites (such as Facebook and YouTube) to some extent 
occupy the same symbolically orienting function as the 
mass media, being part of the premediation of social 
relations and identities, they are at the same time 
transforming these conditions through turning individ-
ual media users, or prosumers, into agents of their own 
surveillance. They are explicitly complying with sub-
stantial privacy restraints, whose character and impli-
cations they often find obscure and/or difficult to pen-
etrate (Andrejevic, 2007, 2014). Previous research 
shows that most media users feel less anxious in rela-
tion to this type of systematic surveillance than in rela-
tion to interveillance practices (see Marwick, 2012; 
Taddicken, 2012; Jansson, 2012) but also tend to over-
look the actual terms of use that they sign (Best, 2010; 
Andrejevic, 2014). What may seem like a space of 
recognition is thus literally turned into a space of 
transactional dependence and “infinite debt” (An-
drejevic, 2014), which in turn reproduces the function-
al dependence vis-à-vis various technological systems 
and infrastructures.  
Mediatization is thus a complex transformative 
force that integrates both a liberating potential, the 
prospects of greater autonomy and new avenues to-
wards social recognition enabled by media, and new 
forms of dependence that in different ways restrict the 
prospects of liberation. The dialectical relations be-
tween these two sides vary over time and depend on 
socio-cultural as well as media-specific factors that 
have to be identified empirically. The point that has 
been outlined in this essay, via the concept of interveil-
lance, is just one yet increasingly prominent expression 
of the dialectics of mediatization. We may even say 
that this represents a new face, or a new stage, of me-
diatization. In this analysis the fact that mediatization 
processes are characterized by a complex, and contex-
tually dependent, interplay between industrial logics 
and more enduring social transformations has been 
highlighted. If we want to formulate an immanent cri-
tique of why a growing share of the world’s population 
allows their lives and identities to get entangled with 
increasingly complex technological and commercial 
structures of surveillance we should take this interplay 
into consideration—and thus also transcend the divide 
between institutional and social-constructivist perspec-
tives on mediatization.  
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